Truthful unit-demand auctions with budgets revisited

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2015.01.033zbMath1319.91087OpenAlexW2146324473MaRDI QIDQ2257295

Veronika Loitzenbauer, Monika R. Henzinger

Publication date: 24 February 2015

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2015.01.033

zbMATH Keywords

randomized algorithmbudget constraintincentive compatibilityenvy-freenessmatching marketascending auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Randomized algorithms (68W20) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian method
• Bidder optimal assignments for general utilities
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game
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