Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-13073-1_2zbMATH Open1187.91139OpenAlexW2161862398MaRDI QIDQ3562987FDOQ3562987

Authors: Paul Dütting, Monika R. Henzinger 

Publication date: 28 May 2010

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13073-1_2

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zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingsmatching marketsauction mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (3)

• Truthful generalized assignments via stable matching
• Truthful unit-demand auctions with budgets revisited
• Aspects of arranged marriages and the theory of Markov decision processes

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