Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-13073-1_2MaRDI QIDQ3562987zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Dütting, Monika R. Henzinger

Publication date 28 May 2010

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13073-1_2

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingsmatching marketsauction mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(3)

• Truthful generalized assignments via stable matching
• Truthful unit-demand auctions with budgets revisited
• Aspects of arranged marriages and the theory of Markov decision processes

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