Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
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Publication:2334311
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108688zbMath1425.91342OpenAlexW2958821478WikidataQ127240276 ScholiaQ127240276MaRDI QIDQ2334311
Matteo Triossi, María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena
Publication date: 7 November 2019
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10278/3716085
Related Items (5)
Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ Coalition formation problems with externalities ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities
Cites Work
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- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Two-sided matching problems with externalities
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- TWO-SIDED MATCHING WITH EXTERNALITIES: A SURVEY
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Matching with Externalities
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