On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
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Publication:1194267
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90051-SzbMath0773.90003MaRDI QIDQ1194267
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (30)
Divide-and-permute ⋮ Implementation in generalized matching problems ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ Picking the winners ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities ⋮ Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems. ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation ⋮ Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities ⋮ Implementation of voting operators ⋮ Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms ⋮ Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations ⋮ On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules ⋮ Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ Maskin's theorem with limited veto power ⋮ Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities ⋮ Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems ⋮ A new necessary condition for Nash implementation ⋮ A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
Cites Work
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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