Implementation in generalized matching problems
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Publication:1363086
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00758-6zbMATH Open0876.90012MaRDI QIDQ1363086FDOQ1363086
Publication date: 1 December 1997
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On cores and indivisibility
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design
Cited In (23)
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems.
- The core of endo-status games and one-to-one ordinal preference games
- On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible
- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
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