On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
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Publication:5931981
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(00)00061-6zbMath1007.91036OpenAlexW2065481763WikidataQ127202962 ScholiaQ127202962MaRDI QIDQ5931981
Hideo Konishi, Thomas Quint, Jun Wako
Publication date: 17 July 2001
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(00)00061-6
Related Items (35)
Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets ⋮ Mechanisms for trading durable goods ⋮ Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods ⋮ Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible ⋮ Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information ⋮ Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Centralized allocation in multiple markets ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Pareto optimality in coalition formation ⋮ Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. ⋮ Market allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible ⋮ Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality ⋮ Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak core ⋮ The unbinding core for coalitional form games ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets ⋮ The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods ⋮ Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms ⋮ Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects ⋮ An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments ⋮ Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples ⋮ Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game ⋮ An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market ⋮ Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability ⋮ Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Restricted housewapping games
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- The Core of an N Person Game
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