Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
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Publication:2100651
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.006zbMath1505.91179OpenAlexW3166480535MaRDI QIDQ2100651
Flip Klijn, Szilvia Pápai, Péter Biró
Publication date: 24 November 2022
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.006
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