Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
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Publication:2568836
DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0259-1zbMath1073.91596OpenAlexW2007779524MaRDI QIDQ2568836
Publication date: 19 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0259-1
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