Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems

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Publication:2568836

DOI10.1007/s00355-003-0259-1zbMath1073.91596OpenAlexW2007779524MaRDI QIDQ2568836

Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 19 October 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0259-1




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