Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
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Publication:2152111
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3136641 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Class of Sequential Games
- A polynomial-time approximation scheme for maximizing the minimum machine completion time
- Almost envy-freeness with general valuations
- An improved approximation algorithm for maximin shares
- Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations
- Cake cutting algorithms
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Equilibria in sequential allocation
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods: improvement
- Fair enough: guaranteeing approximate maximin shares
- Manipulating picking sequences
- Nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents
- Near fairness in matroids
- On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Sur la division pragmatique
- Truth, justice, and cake cutting
Cited in
(7)- Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Maximizing Nash product social welfare in allocating indivisible goods
- Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution
- Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
- FAIR ALLOCATION BASED ON TWO CRITERIA : A DEA GAME VIEW OF "ADD THEM UP AND DIVIDE BY TWO"(<Special Issue>Operations Research for Performance Evaluation)
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
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