Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
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Publication:2152111
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_9OpenAlexW3201343093MaRDI QIDQ2152111FDOQ2152111
Philip Lazos, Stefano Leonardi, Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Federico Fusco
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.08644
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Cites Work
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Cited In (7)
- Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Maximizing Nash product social welfare in allocating indivisible goods
- Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution
- Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
- FAIR ALLOCATION BASED ON TWO CRITERIA : A DEA GAME VIEW OF "ADD THEM UP AND DIVIDE BY TWO"(<Special Issue>Operations Research for Performance Evaluation)
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
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