On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_10zbMath1260.91129OpenAlexW1934516156MaRDI QIDQ3645309

Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis

Publication date: 17 November 2009

Published in: Algorithmic Decision Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_10

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (9)

Truthful Fair Division ⋮ Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness ⋮ Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ Fairness in maximal covering location problems ⋮ Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferences ⋮ Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions ⋮ Fairly taking turns ⋮ On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms ⋮ Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods

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