Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods
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Publication:343902
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2016.09.005zbMATH Open1392.68415OpenAlexW2517956294WikidataQ62043020 ScholiaQ62043020MaRDI QIDQ343902FDOQ343902
Authors: Yann Chevaleyre, Ulle Endriss, Nicolas Maudet 
Publication date: 29 November 2016
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2016.09.005
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
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Cited In (32)
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- How to allocate hard candies fairly
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods with minimum inequality or minimum envy
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- Minimising inequality in multiagent resource allocation: structural analysis of a distributed approach
- Envy-free allocations respecting social networks
- Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
- Fair in the Eyes of Others
- Collective decision making
- Negotiation and persuasion among agents
- Generalized binary utility functions and fair allocations
- Local fairness in hedonic games via individual threshold coalitions
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- Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
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- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
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- The complexity of deciding reachability properties of distributed negotiation schemes
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- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
- Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using ordered weighted average
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- Constrained swap dynamics over a social network in distributed resource reallocation
- How to decrease the degree of envy in allocations of indivisible goods
- Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
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