Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5017566 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234106 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3231692 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3185418 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simple procedure for finding equitable allocations of indivisible goods
- An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money
- Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
- Cake cutting algorithms
- Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Algorithm
- Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: logical representation and complexity
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Fair-negotiation procedures
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods
- On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
- On the Complexity of Efficiency and Envy-Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
- The complexity of contract negotiation
- Trade-off between equity and efficiency in a general economy with indivisible goods
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Cited in
(32)- Minimising inequality in multiagent resource allocation: structural analysis of a distributed approach
- Envy-free allocations respecting social networks
- Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
- The complexity of deciding reachability properties of distributed negotiation schemes
- Local fairness in hedonic games via individual threshold coalitions
- Fair in the Eyes of Others
- Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
- Collective decision making
- Negotiation and persuasion among agents
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
- Constrained swap dynamics over a social network in distributed resource reallocation
- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies
- On fair division with binary valuations respecting social networks
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450024 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7650858 (Why is no real title available?)
- On social envy-freeness in multi-unit markets
- Fair division with minimal withheld information in social networks
- Optimizing social welfare in social networks
- Fair and efficient allocation with few agent types, few item types, or small value levels
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
- How to decrease the degree of envy in allocations of indivisible goods
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Fair division of indivisible items between two players: design parameters for contested pile methods
- How to allocate hard candies fairly
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods with minimum inequality or minimum envy
- Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods
- Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using ordered weighted average
- Maximin share based mechanisms for multi-resource fair allocation with divisible and indivisible tasks
- Dividing a graphical cake
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
- Generalized binary utility functions and fair allocations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6902543 (Why is no real title available?)
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