On the Complexity of Efficiency and Envy-Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:3645308)
Recommendations
- Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: logical representation and complexity
- Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- The price to pay for forgoing normalization in fair division of indivisible goods
- On the existence of Pareto efficient and envy-free allocations
- Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with indivisible goods and money
Cited in
(35)- On the existence of Pareto efficient and envy-free allocations
- On the complexity of fair house allocation
- Envy-free allocations respecting social networks
- The price to pay for forgoing normalization in fair division of indivisible goods
- Multiagent resource allocation in k-additive domains: preference representation and complexity
- Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences
- Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
- Existence of efficient envy-free allocations of a heterogeneous divisible commodity with nonadditive utilities
- A polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation
- When dividing mixed manna is easier than dividing goods: competitive equilibria with a constant number of chores
- Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values
- Fair and efficient allocation with few agent types, few item types, or small value levels
- Generalized binary utility functions and fair allocations
- Fair division under ordinal preferences: computing envy-free allocations of indivisible goods
- Distributed fair allocation of indivisible goods
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4160481 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficiency and envy-freeness in fair division of indivisible goods: logical representation and complexity
- Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets
- Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
- Communication complexity of discrete fair division
- Fair in the Eyes of Others
- Computing welfare-maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods
- Computational complexity of necessary envy-freeness
- Allocation of indivisible items with individual preference graphs
- Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values
- On best-of-both-worlds fair-share allocations
- Diverse fair allocations: complexity and algorithms
- Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items
- Diverse fair allocations: complexity and algorithms
- Communication complexity of discrete fair division
- Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
- Finding fair and efficient allocations of indivisible chores
- Fair division with subjective divisibility
- Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
This page was built for publication: On the Complexity of Efficiency and Envy-Freeness in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods with Additive Preferences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3645308)