Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values
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Cites work
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Cited in
(20)- Finding fair and efficient allocations when valuations don't add up
- Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX
- A polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation
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