Improving Nash social welfare approximations of indivisible goods
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Publication:5114782
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Cited in
(25)- Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
- Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods with minimum inequality or minimum envy
- The price of fairness for indivisible goods
- Nash welfare guarantees for fair and efficient coverage
- Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values
- Maximizing Nash product social welfare in allocating indivisible goods
- Approximating the Nash social welfare with budget-additive valuations
- Fair division with allocator's preference
- Nash social welfare approximation for strategic agents
- Minimizing envy and maximizing average Nash social welfare in the allocation of indivisible goods
- Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
- Multiple birds with one stone: beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via envy cycle elimination
- Fair Division of Indivisible Goods for a Class of Concave Valuations
- When dividing mixed manna is easier than dividing goods: competitive equilibria with a constant number of chores
- APX-hardness of maximizing Nash social welfare with indivisible items
- Nash social welfare, matrix permanent, and stable polynomials
- On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations
- LP solvable models for multiagent fair allocation problems
- Approximating the Nash social welfare with indivisible items
- Nash social welfare for indivisible items under separable, piecewise-linear concave utilities
- Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX
- Computing fair and efficient allocations with few utility values
- The price to pay for forgoing normalization in fair division of indivisible goods
- A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods
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