On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations
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Publication:2673693
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.03.004zbMath1492.91163arXiv2204.03803OpenAlexW4223557162MaRDI QIDQ2673693
Nicholas J. Teh, Warut Suksompong
Publication date: 13 June 2022
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.03803
Related Items (4)
Almost envy-freeness for groups: improved bounds via discrepancy theory ⋮ Fairness in temporal slot assignment ⋮ Keep your distance: land division with separation ⋮ Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness
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