Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation
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Publication:2202023
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2020.07.008zbMath1458.91109arXiv1901.08463OpenAlexW2912266291MaRDI QIDQ2202023
Alexandros A. Voudouris, Warut Suksompong, Maria Kyropoulou
Publication date: 17 September 2020
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.08463
Related Items (19)
Almost envy-freeness for groups: improved bounds via discrepancy theory ⋮ Maximum Nash welfare and other stories about EFX ⋮ Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods ⋮ On maximum weighted Nash welfare for binary valuations ⋮ Fair ride allocation on a line ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints ⋮ Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ Fairness for multi-self agents ⋮ Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using ordered weighted average ⋮ When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist? ⋮ Fairly allocating contiguous blocks of indivisible items ⋮ The price of fairness for indivisible goods ⋮ Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods ⋮ Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division ⋮ Fairly Allocating Many Goods with Few Queries ⋮ The Price of Connectivity in Fair Division ⋮ Consensus Halving for Sets of Items
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