Two-person fair division of indivisible items: an efficient envy-free algorithm
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Publication:2813239
Cited in
(13)- Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents
- Countering negotiation power asymmetries by using the adjusted winner algorithm
- Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
- Allocation of indivisible items with individual preference graphs
- Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation
- Proportional Borda allocations
- Asymptotic existence of fair divisions for groups
- Fair Division
- Computational complexity of necessary envy-freeness
- Two-person fair division of indivisible items when envy-freeness is impossible
- The price of connectivity in fair division
- Allocating indivisible items with minimum dissatisfaction on preference graphs
- Obtaining a proportional allocation by deleting items
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