Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
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Publication:6109539
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_25zbMath1519.91174arXiv2205.07550OpenAlexW4296007690MaRDI QIDQ6109539
Klaus Heeger, Tomohiro Koana, Niclas Boehmer, Matthias Bentert
Publication date: 28 July 2023
Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.07550
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Cites Work
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- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
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