Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2019.08.002zbMATH Open1482.91104OpenAlexW2967765717MaRDI QIDQ2289006FDOQ2289006
Authors: Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Ronald de Haan, Baharak Rastegari 
Publication date: 20 January 2020
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/433512/1/effcomp_journal.pdf
Recommendations
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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- Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
Cited In (10)
- Applications of Optimization Theory to Social Benefit Maximizations in Macroeconomics with Uncertainty
- Stable matching with uncertain pairwise preferences
- Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
- Pareto optimal allocations and dynamic programming
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
- Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
- Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
- Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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