Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences

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Publication:5300605

DOI10.1142/8591zbMath1283.68018OpenAlexW4213094076MaRDI QIDQ5300605

David F. Manlove

Publication date: 27 June 2013

Published in: Series on Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/8591




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