A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
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Publication:2079273
DOI10.1007/s10601-022-09335-yzbMath1498.91280OpenAlexW4282042326MaRDI QIDQ2079273
Luis O. Quesada, Guillaume Escamocher, Ágnes Cseh, Begum Genc
Publication date: 29 September 2022
Published in: Constraints (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10601-022-09335-y
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