Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Stable Family and Threesome Roommates Problems
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Publication:3527247
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_50zbMath1151.91662OpenAlexW2109893326MaRDI QIDQ3527247
Publication date: 25 September 2008
Published in: Algorithms – ESA 2007 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_50
Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Matching models (91B68)
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