Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant

DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9356-6zbMath1204.68146MaRDI QIDQ1959729

Chien-Chung Huang

Publication date: 7 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9356-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68R05: Combinatorics in computer science

05A05: Permutations, words, matrices

68R10: Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science

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