Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1959729
DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9356-6zbMath1204.68146MaRDI QIDQ1959729
Publication date: 7 October 2010
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9356-6
68R05: Combinatorics in computer science
05A05: Permutations, words, matrices
68R10: Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science
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