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Cited in
(38)- Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
- The exchange-stable marriage problem
- Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games
- Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
- Maximum bounded 3-dimensional matching is MAX SNP-complete
- Local stability in kidney exchange programs
- Bistable versions of the marriages and roommates problems
- Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
- The stable crews problem
- Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation
- The price of matching with metric preferences
- Three-dimensional stable matching with hybrid preferences
- d-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Hedonic diversity games: a complexity picture with more than two colors
- Selected open problems in matching under preferences
- Nash stability in fractional hedonic games with bounded size coalitions
- Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- On the complexity of stable hypergraph matching, stable multicommodity flow and related problems
- The three-dimensional stable roommates problem with additively separable preferences
- On the complexity of exchange-stable roommates
- Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming
- Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- The popular matching problem in the roommates instance remains NP-hard in bounded degree graphs
- NP-complete stable matching problems
- Egalitarian roommate allocations: complexity and stability
- Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- On random stable matchings: cyclic ones with strict preferences and two-sided ones with partially ordered preferences
- A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- Geometric stable roommates
- Pareto optimality in coalition formation
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
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