Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
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Publication:3348423
DOI10.1137/0404023zbMath0726.68046MaRDI QIDQ3348423
Cheng Ng, Daniel S. Hirschberg
Publication date: 1991
Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0404023
NP-complete; stable marriage problem; hospitals/residents problem; three-dimensional matching; stable roommate problem
68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity
90B99: Operations research and management science
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