Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2013.03.003zbMath1285.91040OpenAlexW2144128738MaRDI QIDQ2446827

Gerhard J. Woeginger, Vladimir G. Deǐneko

Publication date: 22 April 2014

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2013.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycomputational social choicecoalition formationhedonic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

The three-dimensional stable roommates problem with additively separable preferences

Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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