Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90053-4zbMATH Open0651.92025OpenAlexW2028052033MaRDI QIDQ1106780FDOQ1106780

Authors: Ahmet U. Alkan 

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90053-4

Recommendations

• Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
• Reconsidering the existence of stable solutions in three-sided matching problems with mixed preferences
• Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Minimal instances with no weakly stable matching for three-sided problem with cyclic incomplete preferences

zbMATH Keywords

counterexamplestable matchingsstability theoremK-some formationsthreesomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers

Cited In (29)

• The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
• Households, markets and public choice
• Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games
• Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems.
• Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation
• A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
• Multilateral matching
• \(d\)-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Bipartite choices
• Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Stable solutions on matching models with quota restriction
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• Core and equilibria in an assembled product industry
• Bargaining cum voice
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Groups, collective decisions and markets
• Matching through institutions
• The core of a further \(m\)-sided assignment game
• Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
• Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games
• The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
• Matching with ownership
• On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
• A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
• Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
• Matching with partners and projects
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems

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