Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90053-4zbMath0651.92025OpenAlexW2028052033MaRDI QIDQ1106780

Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90053-4

zbMATH Keywords

counterexamplestable matchingsstability theoremK-some formationsthreesomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (29)

STABLE SOLUTIONS ON MATCHING MODELS WITH QUOTA RESTRICTION ⋮ \(d\)-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ Core and equilibria in an assembled product industry ⋮ Matching through institutions ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Groups, collective decisions and markets ⋮ Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems. ⋮ Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games ⋮ A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences ⋮ The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game ⋮ Multilateral matching ⋮ Stable matchings in three-sided systems with cyclic preferences ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems ⋮ Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games ⋮ On the existence of three-dimensional stable matchings with cyclic preferences ⋮ The core of a further \(m\)-sided assignment game ⋮ Matching with ownership ⋮ A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences ⋮ Matching with partners and projects ⋮ Households, markets and public choice ⋮ Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem ⋮ Balanced weights and three-sided coalition formation ⋮ Bipartite choices

Cites Work

• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Unnamed Item

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