Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-31489-7_5zbMath1431.91258OpenAlexW2979711743MaRDI QIDQ2290371

Jörg Rothe, Benno Kuckuck, Anke Weißenfeld

Publication date: 27 January 2020

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31489-7_5

zbMATH Keywords

matching problemhedonic gamerefugee allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

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