A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
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Publication:2371150
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Cites work
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- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226100 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099369 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3443655 (Why is no real title available?)
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities
- New maximal numbers of equilibria in bimatrix games
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- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
Cited in
(40)- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
- Constitutions and groups
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Stability in matching markets with peer effects
- Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching
- Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
- Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
- Refugee allocation in the setting of hedonic games
- Matching with partners and projects
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- School choice with neighbors
- Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
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- Status-seeking in hedonic games with heterogeneous players
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- Matching with aggregate externalities
- Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
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- Stable matching in large economies
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- Shining with the stars: competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality
- Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
- Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
- Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
- A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
- Two stage mechanisms for matching students and supervisors
- Local non-bossiness
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- Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
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- Finding all stable matchings with couples
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