Stability in matching markets with peer effects
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Publication:2195686
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.03.010zbMATH Open1447.91101OpenAlexW2945176765MaRDI QIDQ2195686FDOQ2195686
Authors: Anna Bykhovskaya 
Publication date: 27 August 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.010
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Cites Work
- Peer effects with random assignment: Results for Dartmouth roommates
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
- Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
Cited In (12)
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
- Optimal student allocation with peer effects
- Stable matching with network externalities
- A model of peer effects in school
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Peer group effects in applied general equilibrium.
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
- Stability in dynamic matching markets
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