Stability in matching markets with peer effects

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.03.010MaRDI QIDQ2195686zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anna Bykhovskaya

Publication date 27 August 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

matchingstabilitycyclespeer effects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
• Robust stability in matching markets
• Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
• Stable matching in large economies
• A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice

Cites work

• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
• Peer effects with random assignment: Results for Dartmouth roommates
• Social integration in two-sided matching markets
• Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
• The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible

Cited in

(12)

• Peer group effects in applied general equilibrium.
• Stable matching with network externalities
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
• Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
• Optimal student allocation with peer effects
• Peer Effects and Stability in Matching Markets
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
• A model of peer effects in school
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets

This page was built for publication: Stability in matching markets with peer effects

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2195686)