Robust stability in matching markets
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Publication:3006638
DOI10.3982/TE780zbMath1214.91080OpenAlexW1537513709MaRDI QIDQ3006638
Publication date: 20 June 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te780
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