On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2021.02.002OpenAlexW3130735846MaRDI QIDQ2060531

Yajing Chen, Zhen-Hua Jiao

Publication date: 13 December 2021

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2021.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

school choiceBoston mechanismtop trading cycles mechanismKesten-acyclicitystrong acyclicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanics of particles and systems (70-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

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Cites Work

• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?
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• Constrained school choice
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• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities