Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:337801
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.07.001zbMATH Open1371.91134OpenAlexW3126143601MaRDI QIDQ337801FDOQ337801
Authors: John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima, Yusuke Narita 
Publication date: 3 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.001
Recommendations
- Mechanism design in school choice: some lessons in a nutshell
- Parallel markets in school choice
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
- A dynamic school choice model
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- On cores and indivisibility
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Constrained school choice
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
Cited In (26)
- Top trading cycles
- Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance
- School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?
- Market Design
- Parallel markets in school choice
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- School choice: an experimental study
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- Stable matching in large economies
- Mechanism design in school choice: some lessons in a nutshell
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
This page was built for publication: Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q337801)
