Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
Cited in
(26)- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Market Design
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case
- Top trading cycles
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
- Parallel markets in school choice
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
- School choice: an experimental study
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action
- Stable matching in large economies
- School accountability: can we reward schools and avoid pupil selection?
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- Mechanism design in school choice: some lessons in a nutshell
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field
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