Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
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Publication:337801
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.001zbMath1371.91134OpenAlexW3126143601MaRDI QIDQ337801
Fuhito Kojima, John William Hatfield, Yusuke Narita
Publication date: 3 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.001
Related Items (20)
Enrollment manipulations in school choice ⋮ When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? ⋮ The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? ⋮ On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems ⋮ Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice ⋮ Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences ⋮ Market Design ⋮ Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints ⋮ Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations ⋮ Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand ⋮ On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance ⋮ Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case ⋮ How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms
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