Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
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Publication:508390
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006zbMath1400.91377OpenAlexW2566428960MaRDI QIDQ508390
Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006
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