A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
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Publication:1915713
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0029zbMath0853.90003OpenAlexW1984223115MaRDI QIDQ1915713
Publication date: 6 January 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0029
Related Items (27)
Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts ⋮ Coalition formation and stability ⋮ Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets ⋮ The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor ⋮ The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ Subordinated hedonic games ⋮ Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints ⋮ The lattice of envy-free matchings ⋮ The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ Restabilizing matching markets at senior level ⋮ Two-sided coalitional matchings ⋮ Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem ⋮ Stable outcomes for two-sided contract choice problems
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