Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00028-1zbMath0944.91044OpenAlexW2156540589MaRDI QIDQ1974049

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 8 May 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00028-1

zbMATH Keywords

matchingcorestable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites Work

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• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage