The central assignment game and the assignment markets

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90038-6zbMath0489.90025OpenAlexW2009911096MaRDI QIDQ1167052

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d05/d0563.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

existence of a competitive equilibrium nonemptiness of the core assignment game without side payments market model with indivisible goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites Work