Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0537-yzbMath1277.90054MaRDI QIDQ663186

David Pérez-Castrillo, Eduard Alonso-Paulí

Publication date: 14 February 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171303

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard; incentives; Sharpe ratio; corporate governance; matching model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Principal-Agent Models, Reputation from nested activities, Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

Cites Work

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