Principal-Agent Models

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_416zbMath1457.91228OpenAlexW4233281697MaRDI QIDQ5149738

David Pérez-Castrillo, Inés Macho-Stadler

Publication date: 15 February 2021

Published in: Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_416

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmoral hazardadverse selectionincentivescontracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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