Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
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Publication:3320086
DOI10.2307/2297432zbMath0535.90021OpenAlexW2047301074MaRDI QIDQ3320086
Publication date: 1984
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297432
Nash equilibriaprincipal-agent modelmoral hazardrank-order tournamentsmultiple agent caseoptimal incentive contracting
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