Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
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Publication:3320086
DOI10.2307/2297432zbMath0535.90021MaRDI QIDQ3320086
Publication date: 1984
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297432
Nash equilibria; principal-agent model; moral hazard; rank-order tournaments; multiple agent case; optimal incentive contracting
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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