All-or-nothing payments

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.02.003MaRDI QIDQ443750zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bo Chen

Publication date 13 August 2012

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardall-or-nothing paymentsmultitask incentive contractsverifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
• Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking

Cites work

• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

Cited in

(5)

• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
• Optimal task assignments
• Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking
• Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation
• Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: punishment or rent extraction?

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