Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations

DOI10.2307/2938221zbMath0724.90016OpenAlexW1974291345MaRDI QIDQ5202486

Hideshi Itoh

Publication date: 1991

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938221

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationmoral hazardteamworkprincipal-agent relationshipsmulti-agent situations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

Joint production in teams ⋮ Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach ⋮ Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents ⋮ Moral hazard and subjective evaluation ⋮ Robust Incentives for Teams ⋮ The organization of expertise in the presence of communication ⋮ All-or-nothing payments ⋮ A yardstick competition approach to a multi-firm regulation problem under asymmetric information ⋮ Correlation and relative performance evaluation ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Cooperation royalty contract design in research and development alliances: help vs. knowledge-sharing ⋮ Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers ⋮ Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives ⋮ Awareness and control decentralization ⋮ Optimal task assignments ⋮ STRATEGIC SHIRKING: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTITASKING AND SPECIALIZATION ⋮ Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems ⋮ Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior ⋮ Voluntary versus enforced team effort ⋮ The optimality of team contracts

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