Joint production in teams
From MaRDI portal
Publication:854936
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.05.005zbMATH Open1141.91573OpenAlexW3121878445MaRDI QIDQ854936FDOQ854936
Authors: Marco Battaglini 
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.005
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Prevalence: a translation-invariant “almost every” on infinite-dimensional spaces
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
- Efficiency in sequential partnerships
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- Efficiency in partnerships
Cited In (8)
- Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
- Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks
- Combinatorial agency
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Sharing rules in teams.
- Joint production with `restricted free disposal'
- How to share it out: the value of information in teams
- Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures
This page was built for publication: Joint production in teams
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q854936)
