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Cites work
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- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
- Efficiency in sequential partnerships
- Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Prevalence: a translation-invariant “almost every” on infinite-dimensional spaces
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
Cited in
(8)- Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures
- Sharing rules in teams.
- Combinatorial agency
- Joint production with `restricted free disposal'
- Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
- Mechanism design with a restricted action space
- Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks
- How to share it out: the value of information in teams
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