Efficiency in partnerships

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90042-3zbMath0737.90002OpenAlexW2011607356MaRDI QIDQ1181667

Patrick Legros, Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90042-3

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalitypartnershipneutralityjoint ownership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items (12)

All-units discounts and double moral hazard ⋮ Joint production in teams ⋮ Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents ⋮ Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring ⋮ Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments ⋮ Moral hazard and subjective evaluation ⋮ Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard ⋮ Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview ⋮ Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard ⋮ Efficiency in sequential partnerships ⋮ Sharing rules in teams.

Cites Work

• Limit games and limit equilibria
• On infinite systems of linear inequalities
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Incentives in Teams
• Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions
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