Efficiency in partnerships

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90042-3zbMath0737.90002MaRDI QIDQ1181667

Patrick Legros, Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 27 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90042-3

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationality; partnership; neutrality; joint ownership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B10: Group preferences

Related Items

Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments, Moral hazard and subjective evaluation, Joint production in teams, Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview, Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard, Efficiency in sequential partnerships, Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents, Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring, Sharing rules in teams., All-units discounts and double moral hazard, Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard, Epsilon-efficiency in a dynamic partnership with adverse selection and moral hazard

Cites Work

• Limit games and limit equilibria
• On infinite systems of linear inequalities
• An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
• Incentives in Teams
• Foundations of a General Theory of Sequential Decision Functions
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