Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents
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Publication:1367910
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2253zbMath0887.90044OpenAlexW2084740179MaRDI QIDQ1367910
Publication date: 6 May 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1143.pdf
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Classical statistics as a theory of incentives
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
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