Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
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Publication:2455678
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.008zbMath1281.91112OpenAlexW2113407186MaRDI QIDQ2455678
Publication date: 26 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.008
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From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information, Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans
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