Renegotiation in repeated games
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Publication:1196645
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3zbMath0754.90082MaRDI QIDQ1196645
Eric S. Maskin, Joseph Farrell
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9wv3h5jb
91A80: Applications of game theory
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
90B60: Marketing, advertising
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Cites Work
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Efficient renegotiation - proof equilibria in repeated games
- Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
