Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- Efficient renegotiation - proof equilibria in repeated games
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Cited in
(88)- Theories of coalitional rationality
- On being honest and behaving honestly
- Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify Stackelberg equilibrium
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Efficient renegotiation - proof equilibria in repeated games
- Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- On renegotiation-proof collusion under imperfect public information
- The scope for collusion under fractional defections
- Intraplay communication in repeated games
- On the possibility of stable renegotiation
- Implementing action profiles when agents collude
- The policy bargaining model
- Time consistent taxation by a government with redistributive goals
- The three-legged race: Cooperating to compete
- Quality, self-regulation, and competition: The case of insurance
- Selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two-issue complete information bargaining game
- The CO₂ abatement game: Costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition
- Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
- The signaling effect of raising inflation
- An axiomatization of plays in repeated games
- Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments
- A note on ``Renegotiation in repeated games
- Indeterminacy in credit economies
- Bargaining power in repeated games
- Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets
- The approximation of a strong perfect equilibrium in a discounted supergame
- An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games
- Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games
- An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases
- Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
- Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games
- A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
- A climate agreement with full participation
- On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies
- A dynamic theory of war and peace
- On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
- Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration
- Prisoners' other dilemma
- Myopic perception in repeated games
- Justifiable punishments in repeated games
- On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
- Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model
- Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
- Price discrimination or uniform pricing: which colludes more?
- Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard
- Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
- Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
- Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
- Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
- Forward-looking principle in repeated games
- Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertrand games
- The market for conservation and other hostages
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18300 (Why is no real title available?)
- Revision proofness
- Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
- Renegotiation perfection in infinite games
- THE FORGIVING TRIGGER STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRIGGER STRATEGY
- Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
- Defensive plays in repeated games
- Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
- (Bad) reputation in relational contracting
- MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS
- Credible forward guidance
- Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
- Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Renegotiation in a repeated Cournot duopoly
- Bargaining foundations for the outside option principle
- Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability
- Bad reputation due to incompetent expert
- Reputation and the credibility of inflation plans
- Maxmin, coalitions and evolution
- Grouping agents with persistent types
- A successful strategy for iterated prisoner's dilemma with any number of channels
- Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market
- Credible public policy
- The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
- Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
- Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games
- The impossibility of stable renegotiation
- Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
- Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example
- Self enforceable paths in extensive form games
- Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply
- Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
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