Renegotiation in repeated games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90021-3zbMath0754.90082OpenAlexW2132980074MaRDI QIDQ1196645

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/9wv3h5jb

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemma renegotiation subgame-perfect equilibria duopolies advertising game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

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