FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES
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Publication:2941051
DOI10.1142/S021919891450011XzbMath1304.91033MaRDI QIDQ2941051
Publication date: 21 January 2015
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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