Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9zbMath1064.91023MaRDI QIDQ1429915

Tone Arnold, Andreas Blume

Publication date: 27 May 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Language; Learning; Game theory; Evolution; Communication; Meaning; Cheap talk; Information transmission; Incentive alignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory

Related Items

Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria, FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES, COORDINATION IN GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

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