Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2528zbMath0937.91017OpenAlexW3124100258MaRDI QIDQ1300217

Joergen W. Weibull, María Sáez-Martí

Publication date: 10 May 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95001

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionbargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (12)

How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters ⋮ Deep and shallow thinking in the long run ⋮ Clever agents in adaptive learning. ⋮ Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game ⋮ Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. ⋮ Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play ⋮ Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems ⋮ Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences ⋮ Bargaining power in communication networks ⋮ Does evolution solve the hold-up problem? ⋮ Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations ⋮ BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

Cites Work

• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Learning by forgetful players
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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