Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
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Publication:2270550
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.007zbMath1170.91304OpenAlexW2115297939MaRDI QIDQ2270550
Publication date: 28 July 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0475.pdf
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